Incident pathway

From a fake bank SMS to an emptied account

Nobody hacked the bank. The victim was moved, step by step, from a text message to a phone call to acting on the caller's instructions. The control point is the call.

1
BAITSMS about a 'fraudulent charge'

A mass text, posing as the bank's security department and sometimes landing in the bank's real thread, gives a number or link to 'resolve' it.

2
CALLThe fake anti-fraud agent

A caller who knows your data asks you to transfer, deposit cash, share your screen or install an app and tap your card. Hang up and call your bank yourself.

3
CASH OUTMules, ATMs and crypto

Money goes to accounts opened by recruited mules, or the relayed card is used at an ATM; part is converted into crypto.

Documented public incident, as described by the police and the press. No private record is reproduced here.
What the example presents
Your bank's anti-fraud team is protecting your money
What to examine
A crew with leaked data, a spoofed SMS and a relay app

Audience / at-risk group

Bank customers, especially older people and the relatives who help them, bank fraud teams, and anyone who gets an SMS about a 'suspicious charge'

What you can notice

  • The first contact was a mass SMS warning of a supposed fraudulent operation on the account, with a phone number or link to 'resolve' it; according to Escudo Digital, spoofing made it appear in the same thread as the bank's genuine messages.
  • Callers posing as bank anti-fraud or security staff persuaded victims to transfer money to accounts the group controlled, deposit cash at ATMs, give their credentials, or share their phone screen.
  • In some cases victims were told to install an app, sometimes after removing their real banking app, and to bring their card to the phone; the app relayed the card's NFC communication so accomplices could use it without the physical card.
  • The group knew the operating limits of the accounts and split transfers to fit them; one victim lost about €45,000.
  • Money went through mule accounts opened by young people recruited on social networks and by homeless people, and part was converted into crypto; victims who reported the fraud received threatening messages containing their personal data and home address.

The takeaway

A message about a fraudulent charge is not a reason to call the number it gives you: hang up, open your bank's own app or call the number on the back of your card. No real bank asks you to move money to a 'safe account', share your screen, install an app, delete its own app, or hold your card against your phone. If anyone on a call asks you to tap your card on the phone, the call is the attack.

What the source reports

On 12 November 2026 the Policía Nacional announced, as reported by Escudo Digital and Euronews, the arrest of 43 people for belonging to a criminal group, fraud and money laundering, with 13 more investigated without arrest (Euronews puts the total charged at about 95). The investigation lasted about a year, analysed some 400 channels and groups on a private messaging app and, according to Escudo Digital, ended in a third phase in October with searches in Madrid and Cádiz. Police attribute 134 scams to the group, against more than 130 victims, mostly over 65, and a loss of about €1.14 million. Both outlets describe the same division of labour: people who obtained bank and personal data from previously leaked databases, 'senders' who picked the most vulnerable profiles, 'spoofers' who posed as bank staff, mule handlers who opened accounts in third parties' names, and a top tier that converted funds into cryptocurrency. Both describe the NFC 'relay attack' variant. Escudo Digital adds that in August 2026 the Policía Nacional broke up a separate group in Jerez de la Frontera using the same relay technique (22 victims, over €35,000). The investigation remains open.

What this evidence cannot tell us

This case rests on the police account as reported by two outlets; the official press release could not be retrieved directly. Those arrested are accused, not convicted, and no court has ruled. The figures are the police's (about or above €1.14 million; some reports round to €1.1 million or €1.2 million) and may change as the investigation continues. The sources do not say how many of the 134 scams used the NFC relay app rather than transfers or cash deposits, nor which banks were impersonated; the banks whose names were used were not involved in the fraud.

Suggest a correction